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INTRODUCTION
The following is an edited and condensed version of discussions between
members of the Denver University Law Review and seven judges of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit These members of the judicia-
ry share their thoughts and opinions on the topic of judicial independence.
Members of the Denver University Law Review posed questions to the
Tenth Circuit judges to better understand how judicial independence serves the
federal political system. The participants wish to emphasize that they are re-
sponding to the questions in a general way and that they are in no way intend-
ing to prejudge issues that may come before them. In future cases, the judges
will analyze these issues on a case by case basis.
1. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; J.D., University of Arizona
College of Law, 1960.
2. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; B.A., Northwestern Uni-
versity, 1962; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1965.
3. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; B.B.A., University of Notre
Dame, 1963; J.D., Fordhan University School of Law, 1967.
4. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; B.A., Adams State College,
1961; J.D., George Washington University Law School, 1964.
5. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; B.A., Creighton University,
1969; J.D., University of Wyoming College of Law, 1972.
6. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; B.A., University of Denver,
1956; LL.B., University of Denver College of Law, 1959.
7. Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; B.A., Smith College,
1962; J.D., Harvard University, 1965.
8. The interviews were conducted from March 27 through April 17, 1997, by Burkeley N.
Riggs and Tamera D. Westerberg. Tarek Younes, Tara T. Cavanaugh, and Kent M. Kostka also
assisted in the preparation of this article.
The Denver University Law Review gratefully acknowledges the generosity of the partici-
pating judges, who donated their time and advice despite busy schedules. The Law Review would
also like to thank the law firm of Netzorg and McKeever, P.C., for the use of its conference room
facilities.
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THE DIscussIoN
Law Review: As part of this year's Tenth Circuit Survey, the Denver Uni-
versity Law Review is preparing a feature on judicial independence. The
article focuses on the various constitutional and non-constitutional sources of,
and limitations on, judicial autonomy. We are here to ask your views on the
role of the judiciary in the United States political system and the effect and
scope of your independence. To begin with, how do you perceive your role in
our system of separation of powers and checks and balances? Has judicial
independence helped that balance?
JUDGE EBEL: The judiciary is the main institution that enforces the sepa-
ration of powers, and the checks and balances of the Constitution. This role
uniquely requires us to be independent of the other institutions whose powers
are being separated or checked. Judicial independence is indispensable. Years
ago, I tried to identify provisions in the U.S. Constitution that were unique and
could not be found in any predecessor constitution. The only truly unique
characteristic of our structure of government is the independence of the judi-
ciary, which is independent even of a democratically-elected and representative
legislative branch. Interestingly, many of the judiciary's powers to serve in a
checks and balance role are not expressly stated in the Constitution, but rather
have had to be inferred.
JUDGE KELLY: I see the role of the judiciary to independently review the
particular law and the manner in which that law is being applied. Being truly
independent means that we can make our ruling, or conduct our review based
on the backdrop of the Constitution and precedent without fear of retribution
by either the legislative or executive branches.
In the federal system, the fact that a decision might be distasteful to the
general public is no reason to detour in our search for what is right. I do think
that state judges who are elected could be influenced by the views of the elec-
torate. The fact that the perception at the state level is one of independence
too, is a tribute to those who are elected.
JUDGE BALDOCK: Our role is as a co-equal branch of government. Each
branch must act independently of the others to ensure liberty. Remember that
each branch, not just the judiciary, is bound by the Constitution. Judicial inde-
pendence is imperative to maintain the balance of governmental powers be-
cause the judiciary is isolated, with our independence coming largely from the
constitutional provisions regarding life tenure and guaranteed compensation.
This permits the judiciary to stand equal with the legislative and executive
branches of government. While the separation of powers generally shields the
judiciary from encroachment by the other branches of government, one prob-
lem area arising from this separation is funding of the judiciary, which rests
solely in the hands of the legislature.
Yes, judicial independence is imperative.
[Vol. 74-2
1997] A DISCUSSION WITH JUDGES OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT 357
JUDGE PORFILIO: There are so many different ways the judiciary acts not
only within the government, but within society as a whole. My role essentially
is one of public service. I ensure that the other two branches act within the
framework of the Constitution. Historically, the other two branches of the
government are stronger.
The use of the word "balance" in your question suggests equal-distance
points. However, the separation of powers is sometimes more of a concept
than a reality. In today's context, I see the political branches striving to con-
trol the judiciary, and they see the judiciary as an implement of public will. If
they perceive that the public will is not being enforced by the judiciary, some-
thing is wrong in their eyes. The framers intended the judiciary to be the final
arbiter of the Constitution. The balance still exists as far as the courts are
concerned because we not only observe, but consciously enforce separation of
powers-whether the political branches believe that or not--because in the
process we sometimes have to make unpopular decisions.
JUDGE SEYMOUR: I see the role of the federal judiciary as the guarantors
and dispensers of impartial justice in our system. It's the bulwark against arbi-
trary action by the other branches.
I absolutely agree that judicial independence has helped the system of
separation of powers and checks and balances. It certainly has helped the bal-
ance of power in government because the independent judiciary has kept Con-
gress and the Executive Branch in check. The courts have the power to hold
the acts of Congress unconstitutional. The Executive Branch can't commit
arbitrary acts without a check by the court. Those branches maintain a check
on the judiciary. Over time, it has worked out to be a fairly balanced system.
JUDGE MURPHY: My role is really defined in Article EI. It is a decisional
role, and in a decisional role, decisional independence is protected by Article
Ill. Additionally, I have an administrative role in the judiciary to make sure
that my staff and I have the proper facilities to perform in a decision-making
role. There is a very clear relationship. From an administrative perspective,
courts must have facilities through which to perform judicial functions. The
federal judiciary is dependent on the executive and legislative budget process
for court personnel and facilities. That dependence is a factor which relates to
judicial decision-making independence and is connected to secure tenure and
salary.
JUDGE LuCmo: Constitutionally, the separation of powers flows from the
concept of checks and balances. Madison specifically was concerned that there
not be a merger of the three branches of government. Today, I think it is part
of the common vernacular of a basic civics class that the wisdom of our Con-
stitution flows from this system of shared power. Madison may not have antic-
ipated the bureaucratic state and specifically, independent regulatory agency
threat to the concept of separation of powers. Hence, "separation of functions."
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At our level, our independence flows from the role we play in this constitu-
tional conception.
Law Review: Do you agree with the oft-quoted statement that the judicia-
ry is the "least dangerous branch?"
JUDGE EBEL: No, I think each branch is dangerous in its own unique way.
In terms of unilaterally enforcing decisions, courts are the least dangerous
because the courts have no access to enforcement. However, the judicial
branch has off-setting powers that make it a dangerous branch.
First, the judiciary is the final arbiter of constitutional issues, subject only
to the very difficult process of constitutional amendment, and the role of final
arbiter gives the judiciary power not enjoyed by other branches. Second, the
federal judiciary is the only branch not accountable to the voters through elec-
tions. This non-accountability removes an important restraint on the power of
the judiciary that exists for the other two branches.
JUDGE KELLY: (laughter) I am sure you have read by my chuckle how I
feel about the proposition that the judiciary is "the least dangerous branch." If
Hamilton lived today, he might reconsider his statement because we have gone
through periods of time where many people would think we are the most dan-
gerous branch. If the judiciary plays the role which I think was intended, it
will not be out there at the front of the pack, legislating. That is one of the
criticisms that our judiciary has been subjected to from time to time and in
some cases that criticism may well be justified.
JUDGE BALDOCK: Yes, with this caveat; if a judge acts not in accordance
with law, but with his or her own personal views and agenda, that judge in-
vades the political process and causes harm to us all.
JUDGE PORFIUO: Yes, because the constitutional role of the judiciary is to
protect the public from the exercises of the other two branches when the popu-
lar notion of what is lawful or should be lawful goes beyond the Constitution.
The judiciary is not supposed to be a popular form of government.
JUDGE SEYMOUR: I think so for the reasons stated above. Even though we
have lifetime appointments, it is a two-way street; judges have to abide by the
canons of ethics and we give up our right to be involved in politics, and to
have certain economic ties. We also give up ties to groups we believe in. The
federal courts have done a good job with the system of checks and balances.
Some people would disagree, of course, especially a congressman who wants
to impeach "activist" judges. I believe, however, that activism is in the eye of
the beholder.
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JUDGE MURPHY: Well, the reason it is often quoted is because it emanated
from Alexander Hamilton proclaiming that the judiciary is absolutely the least
powerful and least threatening branch because there is no constituency and no
control over purse and sword. The judiciary is dependent on the legislative and
executive branches to fund its ability to decide. Nobody elects judges. Few
people love them-hopefully their children and their partners.
How dangerous can a branch be that can't enforce its own orders and that
can only tell the executive branch that it has violated the Constitution after the
fact. For example, only after Truman nationalized the steel industry, only after
the fact, when the thing was effectively over, did the judiciary have some say.
Another example is where Justice Marshall issued a decision holding that
Georgia violated the rights of the Cherokees by taking thousands of acres of
land. In that case, the judiciary was dependent on the executive branch to
enforce their holding. And we all know President Jackson did nothing. If you
can speak powerful words but you can't enforce them, you are the least dan-
gerous branch.
JUDGE LUCERO: I think the public's worst fear is that government is run
by the federal courts. No, I think experience, and most notably, historical
constitutional confrontation, such as the Nixon tapes case, do underline the
proposition that the branches are equal. For the most part, the perception is
that the courts are in the background and therefore the least dangerous. It
should be that way because nobody elects us.
Law Review: One commentator has noted that the Article III provision of
life tenure and guaranteed compensation are essential attributes to an inde-
pendent judiciary. Do you agree or disagree and why?
JUDGE EBEL: I agree. Periodic elections would be a severe constraint on
the ability of judges to enforce unpopular constitutional guarantees. Further, if
judges' compensation could be reduced that would be a very powerful bar-
gaining chip that could be abused. Theoretically it is possible that Congress
could reduce the general budget of the entire judicial branch to a point where
judges would be emasculated even though judges' salaries were not actually
reduced. However, I think public opinion would restrain the likelihood of such
abuse.
Also, failure to grant COLA adjustments to the judicial branch to adjust
for inflation has resulted in significant deterioration of judges' true compensa-
tion. Federal judges typically take a very significant pay cut when they assume
the federal bench. There is talk of a possible lawsuit by certain judges ad-
dressing whether this erosion of real earning power is unconstitutional. I ex-
press no opinion on the merits, or the potential merits, of such a lawsuit.
JUDGE KELLY: I do agree in principle. Life tenure, on good behavior, is
certainly the strongest pillar to an independent judiciary. The fact that the
compensation does not change is also a very real factor. I would point out,
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however, that inflation changes compensation in a very real sense and the
failure of Congress to recognize that fact has adversely affected the judiciary.
There is a real difference between someone going to Washington for several
years and then returning to the private sector and a person who leaves private
practice to spend the rest of his or her productive life in the judiciary.
As a practical matter, everybody knows that if you cross the guy that pays
your salary, he might fire you. If you cross the people that voted you in they
might vote you out. That is the difference between the legislative branch and
the judiciary - the members of Congress are elected to represent the views of
their constituents. Judges are not elected or appointed to espouse the view of
the electorate but to make the right decisions, based on the Constitution and
laws.
JUDGE BALDOCK: Yes, I agree with that statement. The guarantees are
necessary not only to ensure that the judiciary actually is independent, but that
the public perceives the judiciary as independent.
JUDGE PORFILo: I strongly agree. Hamilton said that the purpose is to
prevent the judges from having to toady to legislative notions in order to re-
ceive reasonable compensation for their services. It's not too far from today's
context, that Congress is very apt to appropriate judges' salaries consistent
with the legislative view regarding the propriety of judicial decisions. Article
IIm prevents that, so as to not have a carrot and stick jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court has said that it amounts to a pay reduction when pay
adjustments do not reflect inflation. A reduction in spending power affects
judicial morale, and makes it more difficult to attract competent people to the
bench. Now, having said that, I recognize that for most people, federal judges
make a lot of money. But in the general scheme of things, for a professional
at that level, it's a rather average income.
JUDGE SEYMOUR: I agree absolutely because those are the two things that
give judges complete independence to decide cases solely on the evidence and
the law without worrying about what is politically correct or popular. If you
look at judges in state courts who have to stand for election and who lose
because of an unpopular decision, I think the fact that we don't enables us
greater independence---because the security of our jobs and compensation
allows us to decide cases in the way our judgment dictates they should be
decided.
JUDGE MURPHY: I do agree and I think history has indicated that is so.
For instance, in ancient Babylon if a judge was reversed on a decision, that
judge could be tried for his mistaken judgment. If convicted, he could be re-
quired to pay 12 times the penalties he had imposed and be barred from the
bench. We've progressed from that in some aspects.
I have a different perspective. I was a state trial judge for nine years. I
was up for retention or election every six years. The salary wasn't insecure. It
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was protected. Still, even from the perspective of a state trial judge who had
independence, being secure in Article III has a great deal of importance.
JUDGE LUCERO: I absolutely agree. The power of the purse strings con-
tinues to be the ultimate power in any government structure. If Congress had
the ability, by virtue of disagreement with an opinion, to withhold our pay or
to seek our removal, the whole system of checks and balances would be de-
stroyed. We now have the anomalous situation of cost of living adjustments
being withheld which is a de facto of compensation. I have been told that
bankruptcy judges now earn less than some court administrators. If true, I
think that tests the principle.
Law Review: It is recognized that public perception and special interest
groups, through the Executive and Legislative branches' control over appoint-
ment, jurisdiction, compensation, budget, and impeachment, can bring pres-
sure to bear on the judiciary. The pressure becomes apparent in the appoint-
ment process, but likely does not cease entirely once the judge is on the
bench. Do you perceive a difference in the amount of such pressure in election
vs. non-election years, and, if so, why is there a difference?
JUDGE EBEL: I think there is greater pressure from special interest groups
in election years because the performance of particular judges is sought to be
attributed to various candidates for political office. Further, there are efforts by
special interest, or, more broadly, from groups holding various ideological
positions, that continue even in non-election years. I believe there are those
who attempt to influence the judiciary directly through public intimidation.
I perceive pressure from across the whole spectrum of ideologies. I do not
think any one particular ideology has a monopoly of the strategy of attempting
to utilize public intimidation to influence judicial behavior.
JUDGE KELLY: I agree that at least in the appointment process there is
certainly an element of politics. It would be a rare situation for a person to be
appointed to a federal court who received the appointment by being a wall-
flower or by not being involved. At the District Court level, the politics are
more local in that the senior senator of the party in power has a free hand in
who is recommended to the President. At the circuit level, it is the President
who has the prerogative. Once a person is appointed, I disagree that they are
subjected to further political pressure during either campaign or non-campaign
years. I have been on the bench for over five years and I have seen examples
of individuals who get irate at a particular decision but I have not seen any
political pressure brought to bear on the judge to change a ruling.
JUDGE BALDOCK: I do not perceive a difference. Political pressure on the
judiciary comes from public opinion in times of national division or crisis.
Issues such as racism and abortion place intense public scrutiny upon the judi-
ciary and on such issues the judiciary must render decisions which are per-
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ceived as legitimate. While a judge must follow and adhere to the law, judges,
like everyone else, watch the news and are aware of public sentiment.
JUDGE PORFILIo: No, I have not felt the consequences or even a sugges-
tion of pressure from politicians or interest groups in twenty-two years on the
bench.
JUDGE SEYMOUR: I think the strength of the voices out there increases in
an election year simply because politicians enjoy "judge bashing" based on
decisionsin cases. Personally, and I believe this holds true for my colleagues,
I don't feel those pressures and I don't have to because of my secure opinion.
Therefore, although those voices get louder, they don't impact the federal
courts.
JUDGE MURPHY: In terms of pressure, no. I would hope I don't feel that
type of pressure from clamor. Election year is a time to beat up on the least
powerful branch. It makes for great press. Some special interest groups have a
great ability to synthesize and articulate the very best sound bite for electronic
media and talk in terms of outcome instead of reasoning in a case. Then, they
select 1 out of 100 decisions decided by a particular judge and use them as a
vehicle in the electronic media. They're either unwilling or unable to speak in
anything other than sound bites. The media is one of the vehicles that makes
challenges of the judiciary more dangerous, or at least more frequent.
JUDGE LUCERO: No. The level of rhetoric may increase, the "pressure"
remains constant. I'd like to reflect on a comment that Justice White once
made. He said that he didn't mind public criticism of the court and Congress
joining in on it, as long as they didn't think they could do something about it.
He said this to underline the fact that our branch of government is open as
much to criticism as other branches, but that a judge shouldn't be expected to
change an opinion by the "heat" of public discourse.
When one branch seeks to put pressure on the courts, history has taught
us that the results can be disastrous. I point to the Dred Scott decision as a
case in which the Supreme Court was under extreme pressure to arrive at a
determined result. I do think it's unfortunate when "federal" judges become
the political issue. It's happened before historically--the "court packing" plan
during Roosevelt's administration. It is likely to happen again.
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Law Review: There is a current trend in the Supreme Court towards judi-
cial restraint. How active or restrained are the Federal Circuit courts? Is the
Tenth Circuit more or less active than the other circuit courts?
JUDGE EBEL: I think the lower federal courts genuinely try to follow the
lead set by the U.S. Supreme Court. To the extent that the U.S. Supreme
Court has shown more judicial restraint in recent years, I think it is also re-
flected in the decisions of the lower federal courts.
No, I perceive we are fairly representative of most federal circuits.
JUDGE KELLY: I think it depends on the personnel. For example, in the
Tenth Circuit, I think, as a general rule, no one would consider us an activist
court, making up law. There are individuals on the court who have a bit of an
imagination. And I think that depending on how many of them are gathered
together at any one time will determine how activist they are. The Ninth Cir-
cuit is extremely active. They found a new constitutional right-the right to
assisted suicide. Interestingly enough, in the Second Circuit, they reached the
same result through an entirely different analysis. I do not think the Tenth
Circuit fits within the definition of an activist court.
JUDGE BALDOCK: This question ascribes to the judiciary the practice of
following a personal agenda rather than following the law. Courts should fol-
low the law, not trends. The Tenth Circuit is no more active or restrained than
its sister circuits. Across the entire judiciary, there are judges who appear to
follow their own personal views and agendas, rather than the law. That has
been the case since the beginning of the republic and I expect it will continue.
JUDGE PORFILIO: I do not know what judicial restraint means. I think this
is a politician's term. Restraint is in the eyes of the beholder. I do not know a
judge who consciously undertakes to exceed the bounds of judicial authority.
Judges sometimes interpret those bounds differently, but I sincerely believe
that they consciously render decision within those bounds as they see them.
There are some specifics, however where concepts of restraint are apparent.
For example, where a matter involving state law could be decided in federal or
state court on a case of first impression, most federal courts would defer to the
state as a matter of policy; that is a form of restraint I endorse.
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court was called activist because of its empha-
sis on individual rights. Well, what they said in Miranda, for example, was
that individuals had certain rights. We regard such rights now as a given. Any
time some new concept arises or people not like the judicial decision they call
the rendering court activist.
The Constitution is a document of vitality that should be interpreted in
terms of today's needs. Certain politicians say judges should always attempt to
determine what the framers of the Constitution intended, in other words they
should interpret the Constitution from an Originalist perspective. The problem
is that what the framers intended in the Constitution, from a historical perspec-
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ive, is sometimes unclear.
JUDGE SEYMOUR: Like I said, I think judicial activism is in the eyes of
the beholder. For example, was Justice Burger an activist judge in 1971 when
he authored the opinion in Reed v. Reed,9 holding for the first time that gen-
der bias is prohibited by the 14th Amendment? Was it judicial activism when
the Rehnquist court limited habeas corpus rights through judicial decision
making, creating procedural hoops that had to be jumped through before one
could get into the federal courts? Was that judicial restraint? I don't think so.
It all depends on how you characterize the issue. I can't say unequivocally that
the federal courts are activist or restrained. Those are political buzzwords. For
the most part, the federal judges simply decide the cases in accordance with
the evidence and the law.
I think the Tenth Circuit is less an activist court than, for example the
Ninth Circuit which seems to have some judges who are lightning rods for the
Supreme Court. We have a very balanced court with judges who get along
exceptionally well and work hard to maintain collegiality. Because we have
this rapport, we have judges who are interested in working out the aspects of
an opinion rather than being activists.
JUDGE MURPHY: There is difficulty in dealing with an articulation in an
ideological sense of a restrained or active judiciary. My personal style makes
it very difficult for me to respond to that. The perspective I take, not that I su-
perimpose any activist, restrictive, or ideological view, is to determine each
case on a case-by-case basis. Any type of restraint or activism, however, does
not factor in to my case-by-case process. Maybe that is just a bad habit I
picked up as a trial judge.
JUDGE LUCERO: The circuit courts basically test cases against established
court precedent. We are basically followers in that sense. It's the rare case for
which there is no precedent either by statute or United States Supreme Court
case law. Within that guidance, however, there is a nuanced opportunity for
activism or restraint. My view is that the law is like a pendulum. There are
great forces to move it to the left or to the right. So the law is always in oscil-
lation. The trick is to keep the pendulum in the center.
The Tenth Circuit, from my perspective, is pretty much on the main line.
9. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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Law Review: One commentator has stated, "The provisions for securing
the independence of the judiciary were not created for the benefit of the judg-
es, but rather for the benefit of the judged." Do you agree or disagree with
this proposition and why?
JUDGE EBEL: I agree. The role of the judiciary is to provide a fair and
balanced adjudication of real disputes involving real parties. It is the parties'
rights that are primarily protected, and the judiciary's independence is protect-
ed as a means to achieve the end result of insuring that the parties receive
impartial justice.
JUDGE KELLY: I do. When you appear in a federal court, whether in a
civil, criminal, or administrative matter, I think you have to have the confi-
dence that those who will be sitting in judgment on your case will not be
influenced simply because you are a member of a minority or because you are
rich or poor, that they will decide on the basis of the facts and the law. That is
the essence of judicial independence. I think perception is the most important
part of the whole equation. I think it plays into how the system is judged by
the public. Where there is the perception that a court is being manipulated or
being pressured by people who are appearing before it, the public confidence
is lost. If you ever lose the perception of fairness the judicial system ceases to
be an effective branch of government. Even though not every decision may be
correct, if it is seen as fair, the system is deemed to be independent and it will
work.
JUDGE BALDOCK: As I explained in my response to question three, inde-
pendence works both ways. Judges must be independent. The public also must
perceive judges as independent. This ensures the public's willingness to adhere
to judicial decisions.
JUDGE PORFILIO: I absolutely agree, judicial independence not only works
to the benefit of the litigants, but to the public as a whole. As we are the last
bastion against political acts as far as a litigant is concerned, but judicial inde-
pendence benefits more than just litigants, as the public as a whole takes com-
fort from the knowledge that the public's business is being done correctly.
JUDGE SEYMOUR: I agree because the theory was that you wanted a court
that would protect minority views from the excesses of government. It's pre-
cisely that judicial independence that protects those views because it allows
the court to decide issues without worrying about popular views.
JUDGE MURPHY: The concept of secure tenure and salary, to those in need
of a civics lesson, would suggest the purpose is to benefit a particular judge. I
don't think it needs a great deal of elaboration that it has meaning far beyond
any individual judge who might benefit from it.
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JUDGE LucERO: I absolutely agree with the proposition that the system of
checks and balances was not created for the benefit of the judges. I agree
somewhat with the proposition that it was created for the judged. But as I said
before, it has a much higher and aspirational purpose. I believe the founders
intended to make sure that no one branch would get an armlock over the oth-
er. By vesting independent power in the third branch, the judiciary, this laud-
able goal was achieved.
Law Review: As noted at the beginning of this discussion, the preceding
article outlines and analyzes the various sources of judicial independence, as
well as mechanisms of control over the judicial branch. Some of these include
appointment, jurisdiction, life tenure and compensation, and impeachment. In
your opinion what is the most significant source of judicial independence?
JUDGE EBEL: I think it is life tenure and no reduction of compensation.
JUDGE KELLY: Clearly, the most significant source of judicial indepen-
dence is Article m of the Constitution. As I do my job to the best of my abil-
ity I am assured that merely because someone disagrees with me my job will
not be eliminated and my salary will not be reduced.
JUDGE BALDOCK: The most important source of judicial independence is
the oath a judge takes to uphold the Constitution and adhere to the law. While
Article M's case or controversy requirement limits the judiciary's power, the
life tenure and guaranteed compensation provisions permit us to exercise that
power independently.
JUDGE PORFiuo: The greatest source of judicial independence lies within
the willingness of the judges to subject personal ideals to the Constitution.
This is the keystone of judicial independence. Judicial independence comes
from within the judges and sublimes all other sources. Judges do not react to
negative stimulus, they act because of positive stimulus. The foundation of
judicial independence exists because judges want to do the right and just
things.
JUDGE SEYMOUR: Some of the things in your list interfere with, and oth-
ers promote, judicial independence. Life tenure an compensation go hand in
hand. They are what give us judicial independence. The other things that you
mentioned, with the possible exception of the appointment process, are limit-
ers. The ability of Congress to expand or limit our jurisdiction and the possi-
bility of impeachment are so rare, however, that I do not think they impact our
independence.
JUDGE MURPHY: The source of judicial independence is very clearly Arti-
cle Ill, § 1. Its brevity belies its significance. It is truly a good piece of draft-
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ing. I wish more law students would pay closer attention to it. Their future
briefs would truly be brief.
JUDGE LUCERO: The Constitution is the most important source. I think the
most important vestige is life tenure. I
Law Review: Many of the limiters on judicial independence focus on the
judiciary as an institution. Within the appointment process, however, the focus
changes from the institution to the individual candidate. How do you feel
about the focus of the individual in the judicial appointment process?
JUDGE EBEL: I think it is appropriate. The President and the Senate have
explicit constitutional authority to make political decisions as to who should be
nominated and confirmed to be federal judges. I think focusing on the personal
characteristics of the nominee is completely appropriate and contemplated by
the constitutional process.
However, when a sitting judge is being nominated for a different or high-
er judicial appointment, the problem is more complicated. Although the judge
is properly the subject of individual interrogation for the judicial nomination,
care must be exercised by all parties (that is the judge, the Senate and the
President) not to invade or compromise the independence of the judge in his
or her current or previous judicial duties.
JUDGE KELLY: It is necessary. I think you have to look at the fact that
every district judge, whether chief or otherwise, is totally independent and is
not beholden to anyone. Likewise, at the circuit level, each one of the circuit
judges is an independent entity and while you attempt to work with your col-
leagues, you do not surrender your individuality. It is clearly important to
focus on the individual. Is the person knowledgeable, has the person had the
life experiences to do the job?
On the other hand, I do not think it is proper for a person to be turned
down simply because the majority in power do not agree with the past polit-
cal statements of that individual. I think there is a tension there and we have
seen it in both state and federal confirmation processes. Oftentimes, the Senath
loses sight of what "advice and consent" really mean. I believe that it is a
mistake to prejudge the philosophy and not the ability of the individual. As a
result of this trend, I think that several very good candidates have been lost.
JUDGE BALDOCK: The focus is unavoidable. The individual must be scru-
tinized carefully because appointment by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate is for life. I believe the process is adequate.
JUDGE PORFILIO: You mean being "Borked"? That's absolutely horrid.
The relevant questions are of ability and character and understanding of the
judicial role. To ask a person--and expect them to answer-how they would
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rule in a given situation is absurd, because until you become a judge and are
faced with the real circumstances, you don't know how you would rule. So
character and integrity are fair game for query. Some have suggested every
candidate take an oath to follow the Constitution as written and interpreted
over time. This to me is meaningless: it sounds good, but is not really sound.
JUDGE SEYMOUR: Well, it's hard to say. Everyone has such a fit about the
so called "litmus test." I think every President has had certain notions about
what he wants in a judge and the people who advise the President also have
notions. So the President is looking for particular attributes. There has always
been a focus on the individual. For example, President Carter's Nominating
Commission asked specific questions regarding stands on abortion and the
promotion of equal justice; they were looking for different answers than Presi-
dent Reagan on those views. There has just been more publicity recently, and
the public is more involved in the process and has voiced an opinion on it.
Public perception drives the argument. Historically, the process hasn't
changed.
Probably the difference now is that our society has become more divided,
as are politicians and Congress. So instead of having more people in the mid-
dle who don't care that much, who aren't at one fringe of another, there is
more of an agenda. That's what has changed. The Senate has become much
more active in voting on individual judge candidates.
JUDGE MURPHY: In the appointment process, clearly the President and
Senate are presented with an individual and it is their obligation to make a
judgment if that person can perform the duties and have respect as a judge
within the institution of the judiciary. They always have to go through a
nominee's baggage.
Everyone's experience has been different. Mine was quite smooth, but it
could have been more difficult because the seat had been open for a year and
a half. There has been a lot of blood shed over other nominees. It could have
been that they wanted to get mine finished. However, to be trite, one should
follow the admonition of Truman, if you can't take the heat, don't go in the
kitchen. If you're unwilling to have someone go through your baggage, don't
do it. There are many more lucrative things to do in this life, especially as a
lawyer.
JUDGE LUCERO: The ad hominem approach to confirmation is unfortunate.
I don't think it's particularly helpful and it has a great potential for abuse in
order to achieve ulterior motives. There has to be a better way to conduct the
appointment process than to get into character assassination.
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Law Review: In the last two decades, the Executive Branch has initiated
pre-impeachment disciplinary action against judges, in the form of formal
prosecutions. Do you believe that this unprecedented action by another branch
of government compromises the independence of the judiciary?
JUDGE KELLY: No, I do not. I do not think there has been one judge that
has been pursued for his or her philosophical views. One judge I am aware of
was accused of bribery, and while acquitted, he was still impeached. I would
attribute this to differing burdens of proof. Judges who have cheated on in-
come tax or have taken bribes are certainly not above the law.
JUDGE BALDOCK: Absolutely not. Judges are not above the law. A judge
who violates the law should be prosecuted. Even the appearance of impropri-
ety cannot be accepted in the judiciary. The judiciary must be held to the
highest standards of conduct.
JUDGE Poamuo: Absolutely not. No one, including judges, is above the
law. If they violate the law they should be prosecuted. Theoretically, however,
Congress using evidence gathered by the Justice Department touches on sepa-
ration of powers. Congress should wait to impeach until afterwards. To do
otherwise would create the appearance of interference.
JUDGE SEYMOUR: Of course you could look at that from two sides. Prob-
ably in the past there wouldn't have been prosecution but the information
would have been given to the Senate for impeachment purposes. Congress
practically mandated the judiciary to come up with a disciplinary system for
itself, which the judiciary did. Some people think that imposes on the separa-
tion of powers. I personally think that if judges violate the law, they should
except to be prosecuted. Moreover, in exchange for lifetime tenure and com-
pensation, we agree that we will abide by the judicial codes of conduct and
canons of ethics, and we have an obligation to do that.
JUDGE MURPHY: It is very clear that the impeachment process is very
different than court prosecution and I don't believe that one necessarily comes
before the other. In addition, because political matters can more easily creep
into impeachment, and because impeachment is very different and cumber-
some, such matters could tie up a branch of government. While the practical
approach has indicated that is not a problem, the theoretical approach poses
the possibility of a problem.
Law Review: Article III vest the judicial power of the United States in
such federal courts as Congress sees fit to create. Although it is not clear
whether the framers anticipated the creation of non-Article III judges, Con-
gress has established Bankruptcy and Territorial courts as well as authority
through the Magistrates Act. How has this delegation affected the Tenth
Circuit's jurisdiction? Do you believe this delegation upsets the equilibrium in
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the separation of powers model?
JUDGE EBEL: I do not think it has had a major effect on the Tenth Circuit
jurisdiction because non-Article I courts and judges are reviewed by Article
Im courts and judges. By the time issues have gotten to the Tenth Circuit they
have ordinarily been reviewed by an Article I court. Therefore, for the most
part, the Tenth Circuit still must review non-Article I decisions.
JUDGE KELLY: I do not really think it has affected the Tenth Circuit's
jurisdiction. The district court, for example, assigns cases to magistrates and
can remove cases from the bankruptcy courts. The District Court sits in review
of decisions of the magistrate and bankruptcy courts and its decisions are re-
viewable by the circuit. The circuit court is the body that appoints the bank-
ruptcy judges, while the District Court appoints the magistrates. I think these
non-Article H judges are an invaluable aid, especially considering the increas-
ing number of cases and the increasing complexity of both civil and criminal
litigation.
I do not believe the delegation upsets the equilibrium. If, for example,
Congress had said we will set up these non-Article Il judgeships and take
away a particular type of case from the Article 111 judges, a tension would
exist. This is not what occurred. The magistrates and bankruptcy judges are
answerable to Article I judges. Without their services we would have a much
less efficient judiciary.
JUDGE BALDOCK: Bankruptcy and magistrate courts do not impede upon
our jurisdiction. Rather these courts help us manage a case load which in the
last quarter of a century has become increasingly unmanageable. Our power to
review decisions of the bankruptcy and magistrate courts helps preserve our
jurisdiction to the extent necessary.
However, I do see a limiting of the court's jurisdiction in the area of
administrative law. Our standard of review in administrative matters is very
limited. For example, often we must uphold an agency decision because it is
not arbitrary or capricious. This is a very deferential standard.
JUDGE PORFILIO: Article 1H judges still review the decision of Article I
judges. The same is true for the judgment of the bankruptcy court. In fact, we
now have a bankruptcy appellate court panel. Even the tax court regards them-
selves as part of the judiciary.
I was a bankruptcy judge and did not feel constraints on my authority and
did not feel my authority diminish by a lack of life tenure; and I think this
holds true of any of the judges who have been appointed to Article I courts.
As a practical matter, under the Bankruptcy Code an appointment is virtu-
ally of life tenure as one or two 14 year terms is a long time. I do not suggest,
however, that Article I should be changed as it still grants the greatest inde-
pendence.
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JUDGE SEYMOUR: Since individual district courts have the right to decide
how they will use their magistrates, it hasn't affected the jurisdiction in any
way-except when the court wants it to. For instance, the Colorado district
court do not give the magistrates the authority to hear trial upon consent of the
parties; whereas in the Northern District of Oklahoma, where I am from, they
do. Bankruptcy is really a specialty all its own. Now we have a mandate from
Congress to create bankruptcy panels, for appeals. The parties may agree to
have their appeal go to a bankruptcy appellate panel, instead of to the district
court. There are safeguards built into the system, however, including review
by an Article II court.
Such a delegation has not really upset the equilibrium. The decisions of
those non-Article III judges come up through the Article III branch. It's not a
though they are out there on their own. For instance, if an appeal goes to the
Bankruptcy Appellate panel, there is a further right of appeal to the Tenth
Circuit. So, as long as the decision-making ultimately comes through Article
Ill judges, I don't see a problem.
JUDGE MURPHY: I know there was a serious jurisdictional problem in the
Bankruptcy Act long ago which was resolved in the Marathon case. I was a
practicing lawyer at the time and avoided bankruptcy if I could, but I got
dragged in a few times. Article I judges don't have life-time appointment like
Article Ill judges do. I'm not sure Congress would have the power to suffi-
ciently assign non-Article I courts the type of work that would cut into the
decisional prerogative of Article III courts. I haven't studied the theory of
whether Congress has the power and if so, the extent of their power to dele-
gate to non-Article III courts.
JUDGE LuCERO: We ourselves are jurisdictional creatures and can only
review those cases for which Congress has provided jurisdiction. To the extent
your question suggest case load considerations is significant.
Is the equilibrium upset? Not really, because ultimately trial responsibility
and power lies with the district courts. Intrabranch delegation is just part of
the reality of the explosion of our population. You can't do business any other
way, short of creating more and more district and appellate judges. Some have
argued somewhat persuasively that an increase in the number of judges has a
greater effect on dilution of that authority. In the Tenth Circuit, there are
twelve active judges. If the caseload were handled by creating more judges,
rather than by allowing us to do our work more effectively with an increased
number of law clerks and staff counsel, the clear effect would be a dilution of
our authority.
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Law Review: As we near the end of the 20th Century, our federal courts
adjudicate issues of increasing importance to America's political system as
well as to individual rights. What trends do you see with regards to the inter-
play between such issues and judicial independence?
JUDGE EBEL: I am not sure I agree with the premise that issues are more
significant now than the issues decided earlier this century particularly in the
1960's and the 1970's. If, however, your premise is correct I believe that the
more controversial the issue addressed by the federal courts, the more risk to
the judicial independence, and thus on the most controversial issues it is pru-
dent for the courts to proceed slowly and in measured steps. This increased
risk to judicial independence when the courts are called upon to decide highly
controverted issues comes from many different directions. It comes from
heightened public intimidations resulting from public criticism, and attacks on
judicial decisions become more focused and intense when judicial decisions
deal with fundamental issues. Sustained public criticism may result in a loss of
judicial goodwill which is, in fact, the most important protection of judicial
independence.
Also, if political ideology plays too large a role in the appointment and
confirmation process for judges, then there is a risk that we may get judges
who themselves become more committed to a political ideology than to the
concept of an independent and neutral judiciary. If that were to happen, it
would constitute the gravest threat possible to the independence of the judicia-
ry and, in the end, everyone in America will have lost more than anyone could
gain from the advancement of the particular political philosophy.
JUDGE KELLY: I do not see any change. I expect that the most important
and difficult issues will continue to be adjudicated in federal courts. With any
kind of luck the caliber of the people that serve at the federal level will con-
tinue to excel. I do not believe that the next decade or century will result in
any diminution in stature or independence of the federal judiciary.
JUDGE BALDOCK: Any dispute which gives rise to a case or controversy
under federal law must be heard-easy or difficult, mundane or controversial.
As I indicated in my response to question four, judges are exposed to-and to
some extent, by-public sentiment. In the end, however, a judge should strive
to follow the law regardless of the nature of the controversy. If a judge does
so, then the nature of the issue before the court should not affect judicial inde-
pendence.
JUDGE PORFMlO: I am not a seer. I have enough problems handling
today's problems without worrying over tomorrow's. But given today's views
vis A vis judicial authority, I am concerned that we as a judiciary do not make
clear to the public what our role is and this could be a problem for the public
as whole. We have a responsibility to make the public understand why we
have authority to declare governmental actions constitutional or not. If not, we
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could have a crisis in the public's perception of the judiciary.
JUDGE MURPHY: There will be much louder hues and cries with much
more frequency. There will be, I suspect, many more campaigns mounted
against state judges standing for retention or re-election. I see a great deal
more impact on the state than federal judiciary. In an election year in which
the President or just Congress is being elected, there is almost an assurance
that the judiciary will be an issue, whether great or small.
JUDGE LUCERO: I don't. In my view, the federal courts work best when
they resolve issues on a case-by-case basis rather than when we try to set
trends. It is appropriately the role of the elected branches of government to set
policy and for us to determine if it passes muster.

